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Abstract
Blockchain technology allows for new forms
of online governance relying on decentralized
infrastructure. In particular, it has enabled the so
called Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
(DAOs): pieces of software deployed on a blockchain
which mediate the interaction of groups of people.
Allegedly, their main aim is to facilitate large-scale
decentralized cooperation in online communities. In
order to do that, they provide governance mechanisms
for democratic decision-making in communities.
One of them is ”Holographic Consensus”, a voting
mechanism intended to filter relevant proposals for
large communities. To which extent is Holographic
Consensus working as intended, facilitating effective
scalable cooperation? In order to validate this method,
we analyze the 22 DAO communities and 6000 users
from the DAOstack platform, which uses Holographic
Consensus in all its DAOs. Our results show that this
mechanisms seems to follow the expected behavior,
facilitating scalable decision-making in large DAOs.

1.

Introduction

Blockchain is an emergent technology that provides
a distributed and immutable ledger, which can be
thought as a distributed database with a synchronization
mechanism. Like the Internet, (public)1 blockchains
constitute an open infrastructure, which is not owned or
controlled by a central authority. Since it is replicated by
each node in a network, the ledger is transparent to users
and third-parties [1, 2]. It aims to provide a mechanism
in which decentralized transactions and operations are
secure, without needing to trust a third-party as in
centralized systems. [2, 3].
1 Typically, referring to ”blockchains” is understood as referring
to the public blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum, which are
transparent, have miners, and have a high degree of decentralization.
However, ”private” or ”permissioned” blockchains also exist, which
have access control, are not transparent, and typically rely on a group
of entities controlling access. In this paper, we refer just to the first.
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Blockchain emerged with the appearance of
Bitcoin, the popular ”cryptocurrency”, but has grown
enormously since then.
Such growth has been
promoted by the Ethereum project, which provides
a blockchain-based distributed computing platform
[4]. Ethereum provided a fully-fledged programming
language, Solidity, to build decentralized applications,
Dapps. In addition, it facilitated the creation of ”smart
contracts”, computational agreements between parties
which may be self-executed and self-enforced.
These Dapps have been applied in many fields [5]
including financial applications such as banking services
[6], or cryptocurrency payment [7], but also applications
in fields such as Internet of Things [8]. More relevant
to this paper, Ethereum boosted blockchain applications
to governance, allowing the rise of Decentralized
Autonomous Organizations, or simply DAOs [9].
In plain terms, DAOs are organizations where
the interaction of members (humans or machines) is
mediated by a blockchain application that is controlled
by a set of rules embedded in its source code. DAOs
are said to be able to autonomously hire people, provide
services, gain money for their own aims, own smart
property, coordinate with other autonomous software,
or facilitate cooperation, to name a few [3, 10]. Still,
while this is yet to be seen in this emerging paradigm,
these promises have attracted both idealistic defenders
[11, 12] and those warning of its dangers [13, 14].
DAOs are supposed to enable large-scale
cooperation in online communities.
Large-scale
cooperation has been a matter of debate for decades,
and the Internet has facilitated the emergence of online
communities where this is possible [15]. Thus, we
can observe large commons-based peer production
projects such as Wikipedia or the Linux kernel [15].
Still, these communities face multiple challenges,
such as the emergence of bureaucratization and elites
[16]. Blockchain enthusiasts claim DAOs can reduce
the cost of large-scale decentralized cooperation,
incentivize cooperative behavior, increase participation,
and facilitate open democratic organizations [17, 18].
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One of the issues in large-scale online communities
is attention: after reaching certain scale, participants
cannot review (and vote, when possible) all submitted
proposals. Thus, some sort of proposal filtering is
required, so participants give their attention to the
proposals which are most aligned to the community
ends. This is the principle behind the mechanism
of holographic consensus [19].
This mechanism
establishes some sort of prediction market that acts
as filter for the community, enabling them to make
predictions about which proposals will be accepted,
rewarding those that were accurate.
In this work, we will analyze the emergent DAO
ecosystem, DAOstack, that implements holographic
consensus, to empirically validate if such method
facilitates large-scale proposal voting. With this method,
high-quality proposals aligned with the purpose of the
DAO are supposed to be selected and will require
a simple majority vote instead of absolute majority.
While the idea seems good in theory, does this
innovative blockchain-enabled mechanism effectively
facilitate large-scale voting? Is it actually used in
practice? Does it work for DAO communities?
In order to respond to these questions, we analyze the
activities of 6,000 DAOstack users organized in 22 DAO
communities. Section 2 covers DAOs, the governance
scalability challenges, and the governance solutions
provided by DAOs. Section 3 explains holographic
consensus, while Section 4 provides an analytical
overview of DAOstack activity and user-base. Section
5 focuses on the empirical validation of holographic
consensus based on the DAO communities operations,
and Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.

2.

DAOs in a nutshell

There are multiple definitions of DAO. As defined by
the co-founder of the Aragon DAO platform: “a DAO
is an internet-native entity with no central management
which is regulated by a set of automatically enforceable
rules on a public blockchain, and whose goal is to take
a life of its own and incentives people to achieve a
shared common mission”2 . In short, it would be a group
of people with common goals that coordinate online
relying on blockchain infrastructure.
In practice, DAOs are pieces of software which
define the interactions of its participants. Their source
code is typically deployed on a blockchain such as
the aforementioned Ethereum. Thus, each DAO has a
unique address it can be refered with. Following its most
common implementation nowadays, DAOs make use of
”governance” tokens, which participants need to have in
2 https://twitter.com/licuende/status/1263511552709267456

order to participate. Usually, DAOs achieve governance
through a proposal system. It is also common for
DAOs to manage resources, typically cryptocurrencies,
and DAO members can decide how to allocate them
through the decision-making system. For example,
DAO members send proposals3 asking for resources
(typically, cryptotokens) in exchange for some work
(coding smart contracts, auditing some code, writing
documentation, etc). Such proposals are supposed to
help the community to reach its goals.
Nowadays, the vast majority of DAOs use Ethereum
as a platform.
In Ethereum, every operation or
transaction a user wants to do, implies a small
”commission”, a cost in crypto-currency (”gas”). As
opposed to traditional centralized web apps which imply
a running cost for server rental, Ethereum apps do not
have running costs, but a cost per operation performed,
typically paid by the user performing them. That is
due to the fact operations are validated and confirmed
through blockchain ”miners” which are paid these
commissions. The cost of an operation may be more
or less expensive depending on the kind of activity to be
performed. These facts condition the DAO activity and
the kind of activity that is recorded in the blockchain.

2.1.

The governance scalability problem

Typically, electronic voting systems focus on
providing a secure infrastructure with encrypted and
verifiable votes, which is trustworthy for voters [20].
Under a blockchain, those technical issues are allegedly
reduced, due to its nature as a distributed ledger
without central management, and with its transactions
validated cryptographically [21]. We are not tackling
here the technical scalability challenges that blockchain
faces [22]. Instead we focus on how blockchain
and DAOs deal with the classical challenges in
political organization, on how to scale direct democratic
participation to large groups of people [23, 24].
It is already common to find arguments in which
this scalability is facilitated by modern technologies
[25], and DAO proponents aim to take it a step further
[18]. Within the DAO proponents, the co-founder of
the DAOstack DAO platform, Matan Field, describes
as the most prominent DAO governance problem the
tension between scalability and resilience [26]. He
defines resilience as the tolerance and even resistance
of a governance system to faulty behaviour. And he
sees scalability as the ability of a governance system to
take a large number of decisions in a given period as
more agents participate in the system. As a community
3 Typically, the proposals and their outcome are available as
transactions in a public blockchain, e.g. Ethereum. Additionally,
DAOs have a web to show the proposals and their state.

Page 5558

grows, if an absolute majority (>50%) is required to
make a decision, more agents will need to vote. On
the other hand, resilience in a decentralized community
imply decisions not being hijacked by a small minority.
Thus, growing a community increases the number of
voters required to satisfy the majority, while growing
the number of decisions demands more attention from
voters in a time frame. Hence, scaling an organization,
either in terms of members or decisions, hinders the
governance of the organization. Reducing the number
of voters required to take decisions (e.g. >30%) is
no solution, because it compromises the organization
resilience that could be hijacked by a minority. The
duality between scalability and resilience is addressed
in different ways by the DAO platforms.

2.2.

Scalability solutions in DAO platforms

In the last years, several DAO platforms have
emerged to facilitate DAO adoption [27]. They provide
tools and templates to create a DAO, and a front-end to
interact with it.4 These platforms typically implement
solutions to tackle the governance scalability problem.
For example, DAOHaus5 provides a simple
decision-making system that requires no minimum
quorum to approve proposals. It just counts cast votes,
and if there are more than 50% up-votes, the proposal
passes [28]. However, if any member does not agree
with the result, they can make rage quitting, exiting
with their portion of resources.
On the contrary, the DAO platform Colony6
addresses the scalability problem with two measures.
First, splitting DAOs into domains which are potentially
independent, and can work without interactions among
them in a stigmergic manner. Second, by avoiding
voting, as much as they can. All decisions are approved
by default unless someone has an objection, in which
case it is discussed and solved by voting [29].
The DAO platform Aragon7 requires reaching a
static quorum to approve proposals. However, Aragon
DAOs are highly customizable, as they can install and
configure ’apps’ to change multiple features, including
the voting system. For example, it is possible to use the
Conviction Voting system [30], which prevents several
typical attacks of other voting systems, and which was
tested using agent-based simulation [31]. This system
aggregates the preferences of users voters and the longer
they keep their preference for the same proposal, the
4 It is necessary to have a special browser or an interface to use
these front-ends. For instance, MetaMask https://metamask.io/ is a
browser extension used to interact with Ethereum’s Dapps.
5 https://daohaus.club
6 https://colony.io
7 https://aragon.org

stronger their conviction gets. Moreover, in Aragon it is
even possible to use the DAOstack voting system, which
is discussed next.

3.

Holographic Consensus in DAOstack

As mentioned above, absolute majority as a
community decision-making mechanism is not scalable.
To solve that, DAOstack8 has implemented the
Holographic Consensus that aims to allow scalability
without harming resilience [19].
Holographic Consensus requires to introduce some
concepts in order to understand how it works. First,
the DAO’s global opinion is defined as the decision
made by an absolute majority of voters (>50%).
An approximation of the DAO’s opinion involving a
sufficient number of agents on the decision could be
used instead (e.g. relative majority). However, in
that case, a small number of agents could hijack the
DAO’s global opinion. Attackers could spam a group
of proposals in a small frame time, and this would
require the attention of most voters to prevent the attack.
Therefore, relative majority increases the scale factor of
a DAO, but also increases the potential attacks.
Because of that, Holographic Consensus sets an
absolute majority to approve a given proposal, and
only if some conditions are met, a relative majority
suffices. The process that turns an absolute majority into
a relative one is called boosting. Boosting a proposal
consists of people spending tokens to promote it, until
either a threshold is reached or the boosting period ends.
Anyone can boost a proposal, not only the members
of the DAO, i.e. foreign agents are also allowed to
boost proposals. Due to that, we may consider that two
”economies” arise in this context. In the first one, only
DAO members have a portion of its tokens (reputation
holders), and these reputational tokens cannot be bought
or transferred, and are used to vote. The other economy
is bound to the boosting process, using another kind of
transferable tokens (akin to a cryptocurrency), which
may be bought, and thus anyone, not just organization
members, may use them to boost a proposal. The
boosting process is explained in detail below.
When a proposal is created, a boosting period starts
and anyone can ”upstake” or ”downstake” her tokens to
that proposal, i.e. bet a certain number of tokens that
the proposal will pass (upstake) or not pass (downstake)
after being voted. If the upstaked tokens of a proposal
reach a dynamic threshold, which grows exponentially
with the number of active boosted proposals, it is
considered that the proposal is relevant enough, and
then it is boosted. Boosting proposals is also a way
8 https://daostack.io
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of fast-track them. Finally, when the proposal has an
outcome (the result voted by the DAO members), stakers
will lose or gain tokens, depending on their bet. The
ones who were aligned with the DAO’s opinion will gain
tokens, while the ones who were not, will lose them.
Matan Field [19] argues that stakers are also
predictors because if they do not want to lose tokens,
they need to anticipate the DAO’s global opinion.
Therefore, if stakers are rational, they will boost ’good
proposals’ and filter out ’bad proposals’. Consequently,
proposals boosted need less votes to be approved, which
saves community attention and voting effort, while those
not boosted will require a majority vote. Note that a
non-boosted proposal is a proposal that has not received
enough upstakes due to downstakes or inaction.
As a result, DAO members need stakers for the
sake of scalability, and stakers need to anticipate DAO’s
opinion in order to earn a reward. Note that the boosting
process can be thought as a poll to anticipate the DAO’s
opinion, or more accurately as a prediction market [32].
We will validate its predictive power in Section 5.

4.

DAOstack in numbers

Before analyzing the use and predictive power of
Holographic Consensus in DAOstack , we will analyze
its DAOs to better understand the ecosystem.9 Data and
source code are open-licensed and publicly available.10
Since its start in April 2019, DAOstack has deployed
22 DAOs on Ethereum main network (mainnet), which
means that they are fully deployed in a public
blockchain. At the beginning, it was not possible
to directly create a DAO into DAOstack, and it was
required to ask for it to its administrators, but now a
template facilitates the creation process.
There are 6,083 users in all the DAOs within the
platform. Each user is identified by an Ethereum
address, but the same address can be used in more than
one DAO. If we take this into account, DAOstack has
5,952 unique users, which means that around 2% of the
addresses are used in more than one DAO. It is also
worth to mention that, as in many online communities,
a user may have different addresses (i.e. user ids),
but there is no reliable way to detect them. Another
important fact is that Kyber DAO Exp#2 is a DAO with
4,946 users. If we excluded this large DAO, DAOstack
would have 1,137 users operating in 21 DAOs.
9 The

historical data was collected on June 24th, 2020
scripts can be found in https://github.com/Grasia/
daostack-census and the DAO-Analyzer software in: https://
github.com/Grasia/dao-analyzer. All the data used in this paper
has been gathered from DAOstack GraphQL in https://thegraph.com/
explorer/subgraph/daostack/master.
10 Standalone

4.1.

Users

Figure 1 shows the distribution of DAOstack DAOs
according to its number of users. The y-axis represents
the number of DAOs that have a given number of users
(in bins of 10 users), with the red trace showing that
one DAO has 0 users. To better display the histogram,
we have removed from the plot the outlier Kyber DAO
Exp#2, which has 4,946 users.

Figure 1. Community size distribution in DAOstack.
Kyber DAO Exp#2 (4,946 users) was filtered out.

The community size distribution shows that most
DAOs have few users, while the majority of users are
concentrated in a few big DAOs. More precisely, 50%
of the DAOs have less or equal to 21 users, 75% of the
DAOs has less than 47 users, and 95% of them has less
than 409 users. This kind of heavy-tail user distribution
is not different from that of other online communities,
like users by Wikipedia language [33].
Figure 2 shows the monthly time series of new
users.11 It can be seen that new users join DAOstack
each month, even if in the last few months the number
has decreased towards a mean of 25 per month.
DAOstack is still in early Beta and joining the platform
currently requires a technical knowledge, these facts
may be a barrier to new users.
The highest value was registered in June 2019
with 5,397 new users, which implies the 89% of all
ecosystem users.12 However, 4,944 of them joined to
Kyber DAO Exp#2, the biggest DAO already mentioned.
Still, even if we remove this DAO’s users, June 2019 still
registered the biggest amount of new users (453). This
is almost three times more than the second month with
more newcomers, April 2019, which was the first month
of DAOstack . Besides these peaks, the number of new
users is between 16 and 80 in the rest of months.
11 Note the series last month, June 2020, is drawn lighter because the
month was not finished at the time of the data collection (June 24th),
and thus its final value may be higher.
12 The y-axis in the figure ignores the very high June 2019 value to
favor plot legibility.
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Figure 2. Time series of new users
Figure 3. Distribution of proposals across DAOs.

4.2.

Activity

The definition of activity depends on the purpose of
the online community, e.g. wiki communities usually
consider ”edits”, while free/open source development
considers ”commits”. DAOs are mainly governance
tool to submit proposals, and vote for or against them.
DAOstack also includes stakes, which are a kind of
vote not restricted to members of the DAO (see Section
3). Thus, we will consider the registration of a new
proposal, voting, and staking as activity indicators.
According to that definition, there were a total
of 7,719 actions in DAOstack since its creation.
Registering proposals represents a 14% (1,085) of the
actions performed, voting represents a 60% (4,617), and
staking represents 26% (2,017). Unsurprisingly, the
number of proposals is the smallest, but it is quite high
considering the number of communities. Interestingly,
the number of stakes is much smaller than the number
of votes, which could be explained because staking
implies spending both money (GEN token) and time for
adequately pondering a proposal. Furthermore, staking
is a mechanism designed for big DAOs, and we have
seen that half of the DAOs have 21 or less members.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the distribution of the stated
kinds of activity, i.e. proposals, votes, and stakes, across
DAOs. The proposal distribution in Figure 3 shows
that all DAOs but two have at most 90 proposals. The
exceptions are Genesis Alpha, the DAO that governs
the DAOstack project, with 382 proposals, and dxDAO,
with 179 proposals. However, 77% of DAOs have
made 50 or less proposals, and there are two DAOs that
never made a proposal. It is clear that some DAOs are
extremely active, while most of them exhibit a more
modest activity profile. Again, this uneven behavior is
similar to that in online communities such as wikis [34].
In the distribution of votes and stakes we see again
the pattern of few communities capitalizing most of the
activity, while most of them having moderate activity

Figure 4. Distribution of votes across DAOs
(excluding two large cases)

Figure 5. Distribution of stakes across DAOs
(excluding one large case)

levels. We omitted the outliers for the sake of legibility:
Genesis Alpha with 2,201 and dxDAO with 1,167 votes
were excluded from Figure 4, while Genesis Alpha with
1,078 stakes was excluded from Figure 5.
The 75% of DAOs have at most 121 votes and 47
stakes, while 95% of them have at most 1,119 votes and
313 stakes. The mode in both cases is between 0 and
10: six DAOs in the case of votes and nine in the case
of stakes. These values are very low, specially for the
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case of votes, which probably means that these numbers
correspond to abandoned DAOs.
It is worth noting that six DAOs registered no stakes
(red trace), with five of them having less or equals to six
users. The other is Fortmatic DAO, which has 22 users,
but it has not registered any actions. It is remarkable
that there is an eccentric case, dOrg with 41 users, 212
votes but just two stakes. This DAO has an engaged
community, where proposals are usually approved by
absolute majority. However, DAOs with that number of
users usually use stakes to boost proposals.
All the activity distributions are highly skewed. We
have not found a clear correlation between the number
of users and activity, because there are mostly inactive
DAOs with a lot of users and some small DAOs that
generate a lot of activity. Still, there is some evidence
of a positive correlation between users and activity. We
have omitted the scatter plots and the correlation values,
given the small sample and the presence of outliers.

4.3.

Activity over time

In this section we focus in community activity over
time. As above, our definition of activity includes
creating a proposal, voting or staking. We consider that
a DAO is ‘alive’ or active in a given month if at least one
action took place in that month.

Figure 7. DAOs active months since birth date.
DAOs in dark blue have registered activity in the last
two months (May-June 2020).

performed at least one action on the last two months
(May-June) are in dark blue, while others are in baby
blue. Furthermore, a cross over each bar represents the
age in months of the DAO, that is, the maximum number
of months that it could have been active. We can see that
only two of them have always been active, the young
CENNZnet Grants DAO, and 1UP. In the other side,
we can see two DAOs that never registered an action:
(Fortmatic DAO, and BuffiDAO). In general, we can
see that the activity level varies, while some DAOs are
usually active, some others seem to be less active, and a
few of them seem to be abandoned. The abandonment of
an online project is typical in other fields such as wikis
or free/open source software communities [34, 35]. It
is worth noting that, in DAOs, the level of activity may
depend on the purpose of the DAO and the size of the
community, since some of them may not need to vote
proposals that frequently.

Figure 6. Monthly time series of active DAOs

Figure 6 shows the time series of active DAOs in
each month (that is, excluding DAOs with no activity).
The time series has an average of 7.8, which means
that only around one third of the DAOs are active each
month. As before, June is marked in light color as data
collection finished before that month ended.
Due to the aggregation of all the DAOs in the
mentioned chart, it is not easy to see if the active
or inactive ones are always the same. Figure 7
complements such information.
In Figure 7 we
represent each DAO with a bar with the number of
months in which the DAO was active. DAOs which have

Figure 8. Monthly time series of active users

Finally, Figure 8 shows the number of active users
over time. There is a mean of 98 users who have
performed at least one action, which represents a 1.6%
of total users. However, we remember that Kyber DAO
Exp#2 has 4,946 users, and this DAO is inactive. If
we exclude them, the registered activity on DAOstack
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Staked proposals
0.71*
0.55

Boosted proposals
0.64*
0.53

is maintained by a small fraction of users (around 8%).
Again, this kind of unequal participation is typical from
other online communities [36, 37].

Users
Proposals

5.

Table 1. Spearman’s correlation, where (*) means
significant at p=0.01

Validation of boosting as a predictor

As explained in Section 3, boosting through staking
can be seen as a prediction system; more precisely,
a prediction market. We want to assess whether its
predictions succeed or not. The boosting process has
two possible outcomes: the proposal can be boosted or
not. A boosted proposal is a proposal that stakers think
that DAO’s members will approve. On the contrary, a
non-boosted proposal, theoretically, is a proposal that
stakers consider that will not be approved by the DAO
community. Bear in mind that if no one stakes, the
proposal, then it is non-boosted. As a result we define
the following prediction outcomes for a proposal:
• True Positive (TP) = boosted and approved

percentage to homogenize the differences in the number
of proposals found in the DAOs.
To determine which definition of staking is more
adequate, Table 1 shows their correlation with the
numbers of users and proposals. We use Spearman’s
rank-order correlation to analyze the presence of a
monotonic relationship, but not necessarily a linear
one, as with Pearson’s correlation. We can see that
the number of users has positive correlation with both
definitions of the use of boosting. By comparison, the
number of proposals has a weaker correlation. Due to
that, we find more evidence of i than of ii.

• True Negative (TN) = non-boosted and rejected
• False Positive (FP) = boosted and rejected
• False Negative (FN) = non-boosted and approved
Given these outcomes, we will measure how ”good”
the prediction is using:
• Accuracy = (TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN)
• Precision (boosted) = TP / (TP + FP)
• Precision (non-boosted) = TN / (TN + FN)

5.1.

Splitting DAOs in groups

We are going to assess the prediction ability of
the boosting process across DAOstack, but since DAOs
vastly differ in terms of users or proposals presented,
we will segregate DAOs into various groups. For the
segregation, we will analyze two hypotheses:
i The use of boosting in a community is positively
correlated with the size of the community, i.e. the
number of users.
ii The use of boosting in a community is positively
correlated with the number of proposals presented
in the community.
We will consider two possible definitions for
characterizing the use of boosting in a community. First,
using the number of proposals which have at least
one stake. Second, the percentage of proposals of a
given DAO that reached the boosted state. We use the

Figure 9. DAOs plotted by number of users vs the
percentage of their proposals that were staked.

Figure 9 shows the relation between the number of
proposals and the percentage of proposals which has
received at least one stake. Kyber DAO Exp#2 (4,946
users) was filtered out to improve the visualization. We
see a monotonic direct relationship, but far from linear.
Given these results, we will split DAOs according to
the number of users. We could consider user variability
over time. However, we have found that all DAOs in
DAOstack have registered their vast majority of users in
their first months of life.
In our analysis, we will filter out two inactive
DAOs, but decided to keep the rest, which at least have
performed one action, to analyze the whole ecosystems.
We will use the median to divide our population into two
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groups with the same number of DAOs (10). First group
includes all DAOs which have 23 or less members, while
the second group includes DAOs which have more than
23 members. We will study the use of the boosting
mechanism in each of these groups.

Group A
Group B

Users
95
6013

Proposals
178
907

Table 2. Total users and proposals in Group A and B

predicting approvals, a mean of 0.92, and a standard
deviation of 0.18 over the time series. Whilst the
behaviour of the prediction of rejection has a lower
mean (0.63) and is more irregular (std. dev. of 0.35).
The low precision for non-boosted proposals is due to
the persistent presence of non-boosted and approved
proposals that disappear in February 2020. Moreover,
since that month the precision for boosted proposals
increase due to new DAOs, 1UP and CENNZnet Grants
DAO, that use boosting in an effective way.

Table 2 shows the total number of users and
proposals of each group. It is remarkable that Group
A has just a 1% of all users and a 16% of all proposals.

5.2.

Results of the validation

Table 3 shows the accuracy (Acc.) and the precision
for boosted (Prec. Boost) and non-boosted (Prec. Not
Boost) proposals for each DAO group.

Group A
Group B

Acc.
0.67
0.93

Prec. boost.
0.93
0.96

Prec. non-boost.
0.5
0.85

Figure 10. Boosted precision of Group A

Table 3. Accuracy and precision of the boosted and
non-boosted proposals for each group

The accuracy of both groups clearly differ: Group A
has a moderate global accuracy while Group B shows
a strong accuracy. A closer look at the precision
values makes possible to determine where the difference
lies. While the precision of the boosted proposals is
quite high in both groups (0.93 in A and 0.96 in B),
non-boosted proposals are not as good for predicting
rejection. More precisely, the precision of Group A is
just 0.5 which means that for small DAOs a non-boosted
proposal is not a good indicator on whether it will
be rejected by the community. Since in Group A
DAOs are small, a potential explanation would be that
members of the DAO may not feel inclined to staking
because majority voting and the number of concurrent
proposals are manageable. Moreover, proposals from
smaller DAOs may not receive the same attention (and
stakes) than those for the bigger ones. Interestingly,
the precision of non-boosted proposals is much higher
in Group B (0.85), which means that for bigger DAOs
non-boosting is a good proxy for rejection. Thus,
boosting and holographic consensus seem to serve their
purpose for large DAOs, as it is the original intention.
To see how prediction works over time, Figures 10
and 11 show the evolution of the precision for Group
A and Group B, respectively. According to Figure
10, Group A presents a stable ratio when it comes to

Figure 11. Boosted precision of Group B

Figure 11 shows an almost perfect precision for
boosted proposals (mean of 0.97 and standard deviation
of 0.03). Precision of non-boosted proposals registers
a mean of 0.89 and a standard deviation of 0.22,
which are good values and much better than those from
Group A. The decrease in the non-boosted precision in
February and March 2020 is due to the false negatives
(non-boosted and approved) by dOrg, which has 41
users, and, as seen in Section 4.2, it uses no staking and
always approves proposals by absolute majority.
Figure 12 shows the accuracy of each DAO, as
defined in Section 5. DAOs are sorted by the number
of users, and the color of the dot represents the number
of proposals of the DAO. A vertical line separates DAOs
from Group A and Group B.

Page 5564

Figure 12. Accuracy for each DAO. A vertical line
separates Group A (left) and Group B (right).

In Group A, accuracy is relatively low, which means
that staking is not very useful, but three DAOs have
an accuracy over 0.8. One was HackerDAO A that
registered just one proposal, thus the value is not
significant. The other two are the biggest ones in terms
of users, 1UP with 20 users and CENNZnet Grants DAO
with 15 users. This suggests that small DAOs do not use
effectively the boosting process, because probably they
can approve everything by majority voting.
In Group B, besides dOrg discussed above, the other
nine DAOs have an accuracy over 0.6, and seven of them
over 0.88. Most of these DAOs have over 25 proposals.
This suggests that when DAOs reach a certain number
of members they tend to rely on boosting and that it
works quite well in terms of anticipating the relevance
of a proposal for the community.

6.

Discussion

Our work contributes to validate to which extent
DAOs facilitate scalable governance. In particular, we
focus on the DAOstack platform and its decision-making
mechanism, Holographic Consensus, which combines a
voting system with a prediction market. This method
facilitates scalability by highlighting relevant proposals
and reducing the quorum required to approve them.
We analyze the 22 DAOs of DAOstack and their
6,000 users, which are early-adopters.
Overall,
Holographic Consensus seems to follow the expected
behaviour: its prediction effectiveness is around
(≈90%) in large DAOs. In fact, the data hints that
the larger a DAO is, the more Holographic Consensus
(staking) is used. On the contrary, within small DAOs
the results are mixed, but not unsatisfactory.
We acknowledge the limitations of this analysis.
Even if we analyzed all DAOstack DAOs so far, its
number is still small, as it is the size of most of the
communities. While our results validate the idea that

Holographic Consensus is an appropriate mechanism
to facilitate large-scale decentralized cooperation, some
aspects may have influenced the results. For example,
in DAOs voting has a transaction cost (i.e.
a
micro-payment), and thus the decisions must be relevant
enough for decision-makers to pay such costs. There
are novel methods to avoid users from incurring in such
costs (e.g. the DAO absorbing the cost), although they
had not yet been implemented in the platform at the time
of our study. For the same reasons, in bigger DAOs,
multiple trivial decisions, such as the need for paying
workers, must be voted, and then are usually boosted
and approved with just a few votes. This effect may
artificially inflate the results.
Still, ours are promising results in a field which
is not yet mature to make strong assertions. DAO
governance is complex and it is affected by different
aspects such as the unequal weight of votes that
depends on the reputation of each individual (an issue
that we did not explore). Thus, more research is
clearly needed, e.g. including other DAO platforms
(e.g. Aragon, DAOHaus) or other blockchain-enabled
decision making mechanisms. Besides, triangulating
quantitative analysis with qualitative data would provide
further insights on the results.
Despite of its limitations, our analysis shows how
online communities are achieving governance through
decision-making mechanisms on the blockchain.
The implications are diverse: first, e-voting systems
may extract relevant lessons from DAOs, and the
use of community-based filtering mechanisms. In
addition, the success of this novel mechanisms
for online communities may open the door to
further experimentation,
specifically combining
blockchain-based tokens and its multiple applications
in online communities and, more clearly, in DAO
communities. Overall, this is also a good signal for
DAO communities, which may support the claims that
these may become the organizations of the future.
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